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President of the Deutsche Bundesbank
The financial crisis, though in its third year now, still
presents us with a great many challenges. Nevertheless,
while the number of challenges has not decreased, their
nature has changed. With the stabilisation of markets
and the onset of recovery, the focus has shifted from
managing the current crisis to preventing future crises.
And a cornerstone of this attempt to create a more sta-
ble financial system is the reform of banking regula-
tion. As the field of banking regulation is highly com-
plex and involves a host of technical details, I will limit
myself to a brief overview of the current state of the
reform process, highlighting some critical points.
However, I am sure that the ensuing panel discussion
will provide us with an opportunity to elaborate on
some of the more technical details.
Micro- and macroprudential aspects of regulation
Any attempt to create a more stable financial system
should begin with the individual bank – that is, on the
microprudential level of regulation. The relevant regu-
latory framework on this level are the Basel II rules,
which have been implemented by a large number of
countries. As the crisis revealed some shortcomings of
the Basel II framework, the G20 commissioned the
Financial Stability Board to work towards a reform of
the current rules. A first set of relevant measures was
published in the summer of 2009 as a direct reaction to
the subprime crisis. 
Among others, these measures include stricter capital
requirements for market risk and securitisation as well
as heightened risk management requirements. Addi-
tional proposals were put forward in December 2009.
Aiming at enhancing the resilience of the banking sec-
tor, major elements of these proposals include a new
liquidity standard as well as a revised definition of cap-
ital. In the course of the current year, the relevant mea-
sures will be calibrated on the basis of a comprehensive
impact study and be finalised by the end of 2010.
Although the envisaged reforms will strengthen the
existing rules, they will not change their underlying
principles. In essence, the Basel II framework seeks to
limit banks’ risk-taking behaviour by making it more
expensive and thus less attractive. Against this back-
drop, recent proposals to prohibit certain risky activi-
ties altogether pursue a more radical course. 
One fundamental problem of such an approach is that
the complete prohibition of certain activities is a very
far-reaching market intervention, especially since
these activities do not necessarily have zero economic
value-added. Contrary to the Basel II approach, the
penalty imposed on risky activities would become
infinite. Thus, given the inherent trade-off between
the efficiency costs of intervention and its benefits, a
reformed Basel II framework might provide a more
balanced solution. 
This is also the case with regard to the introduction
of an additional tax for the banking sector. Even
though such a tax could be useful in recouping some
of the costs of the crisis, it is an inferior instrument
in terms of internalising the effects of risky activities
on financial stability. Hence, the reform of the Basel
II framework is rightly given preference by regula-
tors and should be implemented with priority by pol-
icymakers.
International cooperation and harmonisation
Another factor that increases the complexity of the
reform process is the need for international cooper-
ation in order to move to a regulatory level playing-
field. Due to the ongoing process of globalisation
and the emergence of internationally active banks,
international harmonisation of regulation hasbecome essential in safeguarding the stability of the
financial system. The general case for a stronger
harmonisation of regulation could be made by
imagining a globalised and interconnected world
where national rules prevail. In such an environ-
ment, internationally organised banks could easily
avoid national regulations by shifting business
activities across borders. Via this process of regula-
tory arbitrage they would be able to comply only
with the lowest standards and thus endanger the
stability of the financial system. At the same time,
this behaviour would put those banks at a disad-
vantage which are not internationally organised. A
level playing-field as the basis for fair competition
would not exist. Furthermore, nationally fragment-
ed regulatory frameworks would hamper coopera-
tion between home and host supervisors of interna-
tional banks and thus lower the effectiveness of reg-
ulation. Hence, attempts to put the reform of regu-
latory frameworks on an international footing are
fully warranted, even though this adds an addition-
al layer of complexity to the process.
Conclusion
The financial crisis has taught us three very broad
lessons. We have to strengthen regulation on the
microprudential level, complement it with macro-
prudential supervision and ensure international
harmonisation and cooperation. Although we have
already come a good distance, we have to sustain
the political will to stay the course. As we are now
hopefully entering better times, there is a certain
danger that some major issues on the reform agen-
da might fall prey to dwindling commitment and
political interests. However, this must not be
allowed to happen, as only a coordinated and har-
monised effort will enable us to ensure financial sta-
bility and thus pave the way for steady and sustain-
able global development.
PANEL
Anatole Kaletsky, Editor-at-Large of The Times
and panel chairman, reflecting on the Greek deba-
cle and its then unpredictable consequences for the
euro, quipped that the conference title now could
well have been ‘The Financial Precipice: The Step
Forward’. Or the step back, on second thought. He
then pointed out that we have gone from a financial
crisis in which the banks threatened the solvency of
governments to one in which governments threaten
the solvency of banks. And, while confident that
Greece would be rescued, he wondered whether that
would turn out to be the last possible rescue that
was fiscally feasible. In that case, “Greece could be
the Bear-Stearns of this particular crisis, so the
question is what is going to be the next Lehman
Brothers?”
With this he gave the floor to Markus Brunnermeier,
a professor of economics at Princeton, who provid-
ed the academic introduction to the regulation issue.
Echoing Bundesbank Axel Weber (see previous
pages), he pointed out that current regulation is
characterised by a micro-prudential approach, in
which the risks of financial institutions are consid-
ered in isolation, but that future regulation should
complement this and be macro-prudential in focus,
centring on spillover effects between institutions.
These spillover effects can arise both directly
(through contractual channels) as well as indirectly
(through price channels). For example, in times of
crisis, fire-sales depress prices, leading to higher
margins and haircuts; higher margins and haircuts,
in turn, depress prices further, eroding the wealth of
the whole financial sector. Thus, he added, there are
three considerations to keep in mind for construct-
ing a macro-prudential regulatory framework. First,
existing risk measures, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR),
should be replaced with new systemic risk measures
like CoVaR, i.e. the VaR of the financial system
conditional on institutions that are under distress.
These systemic measures should also form the basis
for calculating the tax base of any new bank tax.
Second, regulation should be countercyclical to
reflect the fact that, during the expansionary phase
of a credit bubble, risk generally builds up in the
background even while volatility is low. And, final-
ly, to adequately regulate the shadow banking sys-
tem, regulation should include not only financial
institutions but also financial instruments.
The first panel speaker was Robert Kimmitt of the
Deloitte Center for Cross-Border Investment. He
called attention to the growing involvement of gov-
ernments in the business of business, not only as a
market participant, but even as owner, pointing out
that decisions that matter are increasingly being
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made at the intersection where business, finance
and government meet. Acknowledging the efforts
of the US Congress and the G20 to devise legisla-
tion and regulations for the financial system, he
harboured the hope that “the key will be a contin-
ued effort to strike a balance between prudential
regulation and market discipline”. If regulation is
tilted too far away from the markets, he warned, it
could stifle the innovation and entrepreneurship
needed for economic growth. He also drew atten-
tion to a frequently overlooked aspect: an enforce-
ment agenda. In his opinion, it is going to be very
difficult politically to come to agreement in the
United States, Europe and elsewhere on this. Still,
Kimmitt said, “my personal view is that the new
financial services regulatory regime that will emerge
in the United States and Europe will be more bur-
densome, costlier, but ultimately manageable for
institutions”. Finally, he stressed that it is impor-
tant to continue this dialogue among business,
finance and government on a regular basis, not just
in times of crisis. 
He was followed by Takamasa Hisada of the Bank
of Japan, who expressed his worries that arguments
on the regulatory reforms are focusing too much on
capital and liquidity, and less on risks or risk mea-
surements. Capital sufficiency, he said, cannot be
appropriately judged unless risks are accurately
captured by banks. He also remarked that the capi-
tal buffer and the liquidity buffer are not indepen-
dent in terms of reducing a bank’s probability of
default. For that reason, he hopes that the Basel
Committee and financial authorities in each coun-
try will carefully assess the impact of the regulato-
ry reforms and propose a well balanced set of regu-
lations. Timing for the introduction of new regula-
tions is also paramount: a hasty introduction could
impair the current economic recovery and may risk
a double dip. Finally, Hisada emphasised the
importance of country-specific regulatory frame-
works that take into account each country’s partic-
ular financial structure and economic conditions.
He believes banking regulation alone cannot secure
financial stability or avoid the recurrence of a crisis.
Supervision is also important, as is a so-called
macro-prudential policy. 
The next speaker was Leszek Balcerowicz of the
Warsaw School of Economics. He focused on how
to reduce the incidence of serious financial crises,
in particular on how to constrain the growth of
booms which, when burst, inflict serious losses in
the financial sector, and how to limit the ‘transpo-
sition’ of these losses into negative shocks to the
real economy. He compared the former task to the
introduction of car speed limits, and the latter to
the introduction of safety belts and other safety
equipment in the cars. The crucial thing is that this
must be achieved in a cost-effective way. This rules
out measures that would reduce the risk of such
crises but at the cost of stifling the capacity of the
financial sector to finance growth-enhancing pro-
jects. Most important, however, is to eliminate
those policies that have contributed to the financial
crisis, such as state-directed credit allocation, per-
sistently expansionary fiscal policies, tax regula-
tions that favour debt financing relative to equity
finance, subsidies to mortgage borrowing, financial
regulations that encourage excessive securitization,
and generous deposit insurance, since it eliminates
an important source of market discipline, to name
but a few. In other words, care must be exercised to
identify those components which enhance risk-tak-
ing in the financial sector by crowding-out market
discipline or by subsidizing risk-taking, as well as
those that enhance the credit and asset booms.
The last speaker was Karolina Ekholm of Sweden’s
Central Bank. From the Swedish perspective,
today’s financial crisis feels like “we’ve been there”.
The silver lining that comes with a crisis is that it
does create momentum for reform. Now Sweden is
considered as a good example when it comes to pub-
lic finances, and that is a consequence of the re-
forms that Sweden was compelled to put in place in
the mid-1990s. But the momentum that you get in a
crisis does not last very long: “now we have a win-
dow of opportunity to enact the reforms to make
the financial sector more resilient, but I worry that
we have to move relatively fast”. The Swedish expe-
rience is that once the crisis of the 1990s waned,
some of the draft proposals written up were just put
away, not being dusted off until the early stages of
this crisis. There are lots of proposals now on the
table. “I want to focus onto something that has not
been talked so much about yet: the issue of how to
deal with distressed banks. A problem bank must be
handled extremely quickly, otherwise confidence
will be lost. For this reason, it is necessary to be
clear  ex ante how we are going to act”. In this
respect, cross-border banks in distress are a particu-larly difficult case, and the question of how to deal
with them causes specific problems. But, she
warned, it would be a pity if as a consequence of
such difficulties in dealing with cross-border banks
international financial integration were to be rolled
back. “Therefore, we need legally binding interna-
tional agreements that will regulate the principles
for burden-sharing of crisis resolution costs
between countries”, she concluded. 
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